What experience and history teach is this-that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.
Hegel (1861, p. 6) The recurrence of wars despite their tremendous economic, social and institutional costs, may suggest that we are doomed to repeat the errors of the past. Time after time, policy-makers seem to mispredict the consequences of their actions and fail to recognize dangerous situations for what they are.
Can the risks of war be correctly estimated, or do we really only learn from history that we do not learn from it?
Unfortunately, little is known about how well wars are anticipated. Do conflicts indeed tend to come as a surprise to their contemporaries? Or are they correctly anticipated, but decision-makers choose to engage in them anyway? In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the risk of war is typically poorly estimated by their observers. Using financial data, we examine the reaction of market participants to the onset of all civil and interstate conflicts from 1816 to 2007. If wars are correctly predicted, then those who have a stake in them should not be surprised by their onset. Yet we find precisely the opposite: investors have historically underestimated the probability of war prior to its outbreak and reacted with surprise to its onset. Market participants, in particular, could often have obtained better returns had they correctly estimated the risk of war.
This apparent constant failure to predict and hence possibly avoid wars need not, however, mean that we do not learn from history. In fact, it may arise precisely because decision-makers avoid the situations that history has taught us are dangerous, and learn from past patterns what not to do. More importantly, they incorporate current predictions into their assessment and react accordingly. Predictions, in other words, affect behavior, which in turn affects forecasts. This endogeneity makes it particularly difficult to predict wars with any certainty, as predictions are based on available information, but that information also affects behavior and hence is likely to invalidate the initial prediction-a point related to Lucas' critique of macroeconomic forecasting based on parameters that are not policy-invariant (Lucas 1976) .
Wars that are correctly predicted tend not to occur-or to take place at different times-because leaders have adjusted their behavior accordingly.
Those that do occur, on the other hand, are the ones leaders failed to prevent, perhaps because they were particularly difficult to predict in the first place.
In other words, precisely because we are becoming better at predicting and avoiding wars based on the lessons of the past or the information available, the wars that do occur will be the ones we failed to anticipate.
We examine the determinants of prediction success and failure, and conjecture that the poor prediction record is unlikely to improve. That is because whatever is learned will be included in the next estimation, and that estimation affects what leaders will do. Just as financial markets almost instantly incorporate past patterns and available information into asset prices, decision-makers will also continuously adjust their behavior in response to available information. On the other hand, this process of adjustment can fail. Wars that are correctly predicted and yet still occur may imply that decision-makers understood the risks and saw war coming, but were not able or willing to reverse the process leading to war. We expect this to be more likely to occur in autocracies, and in civil wars. We therefore expect civil wars and conflicts involving autocracies to be easier to forecast than interstate wars and those involving democracies.
Our results also relate to the evaluation of applied research on forecasting.
To assess the quality of our predictions, we must acknowledge their possible effect on policy.
1 This endogeneity means that the difficulty lies not only in forecasting war, but also in evaluating our performance doing so. Forecasts that are based on static variables are unlikely to perform well, and our results therefore call for more dynamic estimation of risk.
The paper proceeds in three steps. We first elaborate on the idea that wars are likely to be poorly predicted by their contemporaries and present hypotheses relating regime type, war type, and predictability of the onset of war. We then review the data used to test this conjecture, including data on government bond yields and control variables. Finally, we show three main results: contemporaries tend to underestimate the risks of war; our ability to estimate this risk has not improved over the past 200 years; and interstate wars and those involving democracies are more surprising than intrastate conflicts or those involving non-democracies.
and not to study the quality of the market's forecast itself. In addition, the Tetlock (2005) is more specifically focused on the quality of forecasts, but has no data on conflict and also a more limited time-frame.
We hypothesize here that wars will be poorly predicted. That is because the estimated probability of war at time t will affect the actions taken by leaders, and hence change the actual probability of war at time t+1. Leaders assess the future and base their choices on what they have learned from history and their rational expectations given available information. Those who recognize the danger might adjust their behavior and negotiating stance accordingly to avoid war. For example, aggressive states may tone down their rhetoric, demands may be softened, troops withdrawn from the border, or rising states may make concessions to alleviate the fears their growth generates (Chadefaux 2011) . Alternatively, forecasts of a distant war may prompt countries to attack now, perhaps before a power shift, so that the initial predictions are again invalidated. On the contrary, states who underestimate the risk of war may behave more recklessly or demand larger concessions in negotiations.
Because of this feedforward effect, wars will be more likely to occur when they are poorly predicted because parties will not have taken the steps necessary to avoid them. In short, leaders may work harder at preventing seemingly looming conflicts, so that a high predicted probability of conflict may not actually translate into an actual high probability of conflict. As a result, because only the most difficult cases translate into wars, we are likely to observe that our ability to forecast the onset of war is poor.
This issue of endogeneity is related to, but distinct from Gartzke's (1999) idea that incomplete information also creates a limit to our ability to forecast. Gartzke argues that, because war is caused by incomplete information (Fearon 1995) , its onset itself must logically be uncertain. Rational actors update their beliefs using public information and adjust their bargaining strategy accordingly. Additional information in favour of one party will simply lead her to demand more, again pushing the negotiation to the point where both parties are indifferent between war and peace-i.e., where the onset of war is "in the error term." Whereas Gartzke's work applies to crisis bargaining, the focus here is on how leaders incorporate the (potentially distant) probability of war into their decisions. In other words, forecasts affect behavior, which in turn affects forecasts. Gartzke's argument, on the other hand, is about offers and counteroffers in the context of crisis bargaining, and the idea that concessions by one country will lead the other to push for further concessions, up to the point where war is again "in the error term."
Hypotheses
If indeed decision-makers tend to avoid the wars that they predict, then counterintuitively we expect to observe that wars will remain as unpredictable as ever. That is because as forecasts improve, only the wars that are particularly hard to predict do occur. As a result, the wars that we do observe should be as surprising today as they were at the beginning of our sample in 1816, and no significant pattern should emerge over time.
Again, this does not mean that our ability to predict has not improved.
It simply means that the wars that do occur tend to be those that contemporaries failed to predict-and hence possibly to avoid. Those that were correctly predicted-and there may be more and more of them-simply tend not to occur, and hence never enter our sample. What we have, in essence, is a selection bias by which only those wars that were poorly predicted enter the sample. Hence what we expect to observe is a constant level of surprise at the onset of war, even though our ability to forecast may have improved.
Hypothesis 1 (Constant Predictability) The average magnitude of the shock associated with the onset of war is constant over time.
Our second hypothesis relates to regime type. Because democracies are more transparent, their policies and decisions are more easily and reliably observable, both to other states and to domestic audiences. Their policies are also more likely to be challenged domestically or to receive unwanted attention from the media. This has two effects. First, policy will tend to nimbler, and hence more reactive to updates in the perceived probability of war. Just as liquid financial markets are less predictable than illiquid ones, decisionmakers who incorporate new information or parameters rapidly push the current policy to the point where it is no longer easily predictable. A second effect is that this attention and the potential challenges from the opposition and the media may lead democratic leaders to be particular discreet about their plans, so that their opponents may not discover them (Chadefaux 2015b) , and wars are therefore more likely to come as a surprise. As a corollary, autocracies and their leaders may be more predictable, and their preparation for war more obvious. Counterintuitively, then, the transparency that characterizes democracies may lead to a lower predictability of their foreign policy choices.
Hypothesis 2 (Regime Type) The onset of conflict in democracies is associated with a larger shock than in autocracies.
We also expect civil wars to be more predictable than interstate wars.
First, actors in civil wars are less clearly defined than in interstate wars. For rebels to even identify themselves may be risky, and their forces may need to build over a significant period of time before they reach a size sufficient to challenge the central government. These buildups will therefore be more visible and predictable than the sudden mobilization that characterizes interstate wars. In addition, low-level skirmishes, which do not reach the level of conflict per se, may be more frequent than in interstate wars, thereby signaling the rising level of tensions to market observers. Bargaining tends to be stickier. Moreover, civil wars often rely on deep animosities and built-up tensions. These may be harder to reverse than in the case of interstate wars, where a clear chain of command will help prevent escalation and accidents.
Civil wars, then, are expected to be easier to predict because their dynamic is harder to reverse and their buildup slower and more visible.
Hypothesis 3 (Conflict Type) The onset of interstate conflicts is associated with a larger shock than the onset of intrastate conflicts.
Empirical Strategy and Data

Measuring Surprise
To evaluate these hypotheses, we need an estimate of contemporaries' beliefs around the time of the onset. Several measures are possible. Reading newspapers, for example, might give us a sense of the perceived probability of war (Ramey 2011 , Chadefaux 2014 . News, however, suffer from a major drawback. They are likely to respond to novelty more than to reflect true underlying concerns. Thus the number of articles about the war after its onset is likely to increase sharply, but that need not indicate surprise-simply that its onset has put it to the fore. That interest may wane once the novelty wears out ( fig. A1 ).
What we need instead is the perception of those who have a real stake in the conflict, and an incentive to reveal their true perception of the risks of war. Financial markets are particularly well suited for that purpose, because they aggregate the opinion of a large number of participants who have a stake in correctly estimating risk. Those who misestimate risk may lose money. Through prices, then, market participants reveal their true beliefs about geopolitical risk.
Government bond yields, in particular, are an ideal source of information about the market's perception of a country's probability of war. Government bonds (or 'sovereign' bonds) are the standard way by which national governments borrow from the market. They are typically issued in exchange for regular interest payments and the promise to repay the principal once the bond reaches its maturity. The price of the bond (and hence its yield) depends on the perceived sovereign risk. A high yield will be demanded when the perceived risk is high, whereas 'safe' countries will be able to borrow at low interest rates. If the yield is too low, investors will prefer other financial assets such as equities, commodities (e.g., gold), or even cash.
Wars, in turn, generate two main kinds of sovereign risks for investors.
First, the government may contract so much debt to finance war that it will be unable to repay the principal once the bond matures. This possibility drives down the prices of bonds (and hence their yields increase). Even if the government honors its debts, a second risk is the inflation that is likely to be associated with a costly conflict. This inflation reduces the investor's real return, and hence a higher nominal yield will be demanded today to compensate for this risk.
Together, these risks imply that a bondholder aware of a pending war should demand a higher yield today. Investors calculate the expected (and discounted) return from a given bond, and all information available is immediately incorporated into the price (Fama 1991 (Carter & Signorino 2010) .
Control variables include the size of the prior change in bond yields for that country ('∆ 3 YIELD (lag)'). This variable measures the magnitude of increase on decrease in bond yields in the three months preceding the war.
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We include this variable because we expect some time-dependence in shocks.
We also control for the average change in bond yields in the world in that year, since average bond yields or their variance might decrease over time,
independently of the onset of war. We also control for the country's national material capabilities ( A larger number of conflicts in the world should therefore reduce the surprise associated with conflicts.
Moreover, we think that a measure of severity should be added to our model, such as the total number of casualties for this country-war (DEATHS)
(similar results hold if we use its duration instead). Indeed, deadlier and longer wars tend to be costlier, and hence will likely lead to a larger shift.
Of course, severity is a variable that remains undefined at the time of the onset-it will only be known at the end of the war-and hence it might seem odd to include it as a control variable for the size of the shift in bond yields at the time of the onset. However, investors form an estimate of the severity before its onset. Their estimate may be based on the participants' absolute or relative strength, their perceived resolve, or the tactical and strategic context. One possibility to include this estimate would therefore be to control for variables such as the balance of capabilities before the onset or some measure of resolve. Yet, barring any empirical evidence as to how exactly market participants form their expectations about the severity, the best approximation we can use for their estimation is the actual severity. In addition, casualties and intensity in the first three months of the war (the period we use here) is likely to be correlated with the overall severity. Still, our main results hold even if severity variables are dropped from the model, although the coefficient on the interstate war variable is not longer significant (table A4) .
Clearly, government bond yields depend on many additional economic and political factors. For example, they are highly correlated with the rates set by the central bank or the level of inflation. One would therefore be tempted to control for these various factors in estimating the impact of conflict on bond yields. Despite the availability of these data, however, our interest is not in explaining the variance in bond yields as much as possible. Including central bank rates, for example, would explain away a lot of the variation, but we are actually interested in that variation itself. If bond yields jump following the onset of war because central banks tend to increase their rates, it remains true that markets fail to anticipate the rate hike and hence the war (see also Poast 2015).
In fact, market prices-of which bond yields are an instance-already incorporate all the public information available. The yield of a bond at time 
Results
We first examine the behavior of yields around the start of wars. Do they really jump at the onset, how often, and by how much? And what explains the variation in the level and frequency of the shock? Are civil wars, for example, more surprising than intrastate wars? And has our ability to predict improved over time?
Do Wars Really Come as a Surprise?
If wars are indeed surprising to their contemporaries, then we expect to observe a shock around their onset. Because wars often lead to higher inflation and/or default, market participants will demand a premium to hold these bonds.
We first test this hypothesis using yield fluctuations around the onset of conflict. For each of the 1,935 conflicts in our data, our dependent variable is the yield of that country's sovereign bond three months before and after the onset of conflict. We normalize these time series as z-scores based on the pre-war distribution. 5 The resulting dataset has about 69,000 entries, with an average of 33 observations per country-war. For illustration purposes, we also aggregated these normalized time series for all 176 large wars in our sample (those with at least 10,000 deaths).
6 Overall, the pattern shows a clear jump very shortly before war and immediately following its onset ( fig. 2 ).
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5 Using the entire pre-and post-war period makes little difference. 6 While we include conflicts of all sizes later in the analysis, we do not expect a large reaction of the market to minor conflicts and hence not one that can be detected graphically.
7 A simple way to test the difference between yields pre-and post-onset is to simply run a t-test or a Mann-Whitney test (t = −11.7 (p < 0.001); Mann-Whitney W = 150,339 (p < 0.001)). All three lead us to reject the hypothesis that both samples (pre-and post-onset) are equal, again suggesting a surprise. The problem with these tests, however, is that the null hypothesis may be rejected because of the non-stationarity of the data. Assuming for example an increasing but smooth-continuous-trend, all of these tests would conclude to a significant difference between bond yield before and after war, but not whether there is a surprise or not.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
The magnitude of the jump is also of interest, and again depends on the severity of the war to come. Thus the median increase following the onset of a large war is about 0.8 standard deviations, whereas it is indistinguishable from 0 for wars with fewer than 1,000 casualties ( fig. 3 ).
[ Of course the larger the threshold for a 'surprise', the fewer wars qualify as surprises. The answer also depends on the size of the war, since larger wars tend to lead to larger jumps. Wars with at least 1,000 battle deaths, for example, lead to an increase in government bond yield in more than 70% of cases (i.e., in 70 large wars out of 100, the average yield in the three months following the onset of war is larger than the yield in the preceding three months), but no conflict led to an increase of more than 1.8 standard deviations.
[ Figure 4 about here.]
We now confirm these results more formally by estimating a model in which time series of bond yields for all 1,935 conflicts (normalized as zscores) were regressed on a dummy variable coded as zero before the onset, and one thereafter (AFTER). In addition, we include a variable measuring the number of days until or since war (TIME TO WAR).
8 Finally, because markets may not worry about small skirmishes, we expect only large wars to exhibit this jump and therefore interact the AFTER dummy with a dummy for large wars (LARGE). The idea behind this regression design is that if markets are capable of correctly estimating the risk of war, then they should estimate it to be high before the war, and hence we should not observe a jump in yields around the time of the onset. In other words the 'Time To
War' variable would be significant-a smooth increase towards the value it takes after the war-but the 'After' war dummy would not, since there would be no jump. Yet we find exactly the opposite, which indicates that the onset of large wars does lead to a level shift in yields (table 1) .
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[ the onset of war from the average yield in the three months that follow it.
Whereas the previous section was concerned with whether a shock occurred at all, here we are interested in the size of the shock as a function of various covariates.
We regressed the size of the shock following each conflict on a number of covariate described above.
10 Our results are reported in table 2. We find that our hypotheses are largely supported. In particular, the coefficient on date has a small and statistically insignificant effect on the size of the surprise.
[ Table 2 about here.] Figure 5a and 5b provide visual intuition for this result by displaying the shock that followed each of the 1,935 wars in our sample, and the absence of pattern over time. This matches our expectations that continuous learning and policy adjustments would lead to ever changing or more complex patterns prior to conflict, and hence to the fact that the wars that do occur are those that could not have been easily predicted. Just as markets are essentially random walks because participants continuously incorporate new information in such a way that no arbitrage is possible, leaders also adopt decisions in reaction to what they know from the past and the information available. This 10 Because a single war can have several entries in the data (e.g., France, Germany and the UK all enter the data for WWI), we expect some dependence between these observations. Had the war been anticipated in Germany, for example, it would probably not have come as a complete surprise in France. We therefore cluster all our standard errors by war (results are similar if we cluster by country or country and war instead). We do not include country fixed effects since both an F-test of the joint significance of all fixed effects, and the AIC/BIC scores suggest that they are not justified here. Their inclusion, however, does not affect any of our results.
constant process of adjustment means that war cannot be easily forecasted.
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[ Figure 5 about here.]
In line with our expectations, we also find the magnitude of the shock to be larger in democratic countries than in autocratic ones, supporting hypothesis 2. This effect is strongly significant (see fig. A3 for illustration).
Moreover, interstate wars are also more likely to be associated with larger shocks than intrastate wars, though the significance of the coefficient disappears if we remove measures of severity from the analysis (table A4) . Both results support the theory that the transparency and flexibility of the bargaining process will lead the wars that do occur to be more surprising than when bargaining is sticky.
Robustness Checks
Consider now the robustness of these results to alternative model specifications. We first vary the time window (so far we used yield t∈[w,w+3] − yield t∈ [w−3,w) , where yield is the average yield over that period) from three months to one month (table A2) and one year (table A3) , and obtain very similar results.
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Moreover, the size of the shift may be the wrong dependent variable. For example, we may have found civil wars to be less surprising (i.e., lead to a lower shock) than interstate wars simply because investors care less about them than they care about interstate wars, in part because civil wars tend to occur in poorer countries. In other words the magnitude of the shock may be irrelevant, and perhaps it is better to explain whether there is a shock at all or not. We therefore estimated the same model as in table 2, but this time using a logit where the dependent variable is whether a positive change occurs or not. That is, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the change between the government bond yield before and after the onset of war Table A7 reports the results of this regression. While many variables lose their significance, all have the expected sign. In fact, the effect of time even becomes positive. In other words, according to this metric, the average level of surprise at the onset of war has increased rather than decreased over the years (see also Figures 5c and 5d) .
Finally, a possible criticism is that the jump in yields we observe is not evidence of a surprise at the onset of war, but would rather be due to uncertainty about the precise timing of the onset. Yet the fact that we use long-dated bonds should alleviate this concern. Bonds with ten-year maturity should be affected by distant events, as it would be irrational for investors to wait until the very onset of war to demand a higher yield.
Conclusion
Policy-makers and students of international relations have long sought to anticipate and prevent the onset of conflict. Yet results presented here suggest that even those who have a financial interest in their accurate prediction have been rather unsuccessful. This does not imply that contemporaries are oblivious to the escalation of tensions (Chadefaux 2014) , but that they do tend to underestimate the risk of war.
Yet this seemingly damning result may in fact not be an indictment of markets' forecasting ability. Rather, because conflicts that are anticipated well ahead may be more likely to be avoided, only the difficult cases are left in our sample. The apparent recurrent failure to estimate the risk of war may in that sense simply be a selection effect. If policy-makers incorporate all available information-including lessons from the past and forecasts given available data-then predictions may be constantly improving such that only new situations lead to war and surprise. The fact that wars are just as surprising today as they were in 1816 supports this selection process, by which only the wars that are the most difficult to predict occur. As a corollary, when wars cannot easily be avoided-as is the case for civil wars or autocracies, for example-we find that observers are not as surprised by their onset as in more reactive environments, which supports the logic of the endogeneity of forecasts and behavior.
If the errors of the past and current information contribute to the formation of ever improving predictions, and hence possibly to the prevention of more wars, then perhaps the frequency of conflicts should decrease over time.
In other words, do our results imply that war should be on the decline? This is the hypothesis popularized by Pinker (2011) (see also Braumoeller 2013 ).
Yet the prevention of conflicts need not mean that conflicts will be scarcer.
Wars may no longer originate in simple mistakes-these have been addressed by institutions or lessons from the past (remember that institutions such as the UN, the European Union, and various mediation mechanisms were designed specifically to learn from past mistakes)-but ever more complex pre-war patterns may emerge, still resulting in conflict, albeit at a possibly different time and place.
Our findings may also suggest a "policy efficiency" hypothesis. If the evi-dence for market efficiency is the quasi-impossibility to predict future changes in asset prices based on current patterns, then the constant inability of markets to correctly assess the risks of war may also mean that policy-makers incorporate existing information rapidly into their decisions, and hence that policy in that sense is "efficient". Additional work on how leaders incorporate new information and forecasts into their decisions may lead to further insights on this subject.
Wars are, at least in part, failures of predictions. They often occur when their participants fail to predict the consequences of their actions. Far from being a depressing diagnostic, then, our results show the importance of prediction as an instrument of conflict prevention, and the role of scholars in bridging the gap between basic and applied research. While great progress has been made in the area of conflict forecasting, our analyses still rely too often on static variables rather than on dynamic and strategic considerations. Table A7 : Regression of absolute value of change in bond yield around onset of war (three-month window).
